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USAF	  Major	  Michael	  J.	  Adams	  
Report	  of	  the	  Air	  Force-­‐NASA	  	  
Accident	  InvesJgaJon	  Board	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The	  Highly	  Successful	  X-­‐15	  Research	  Program	  
•  X-­‐15	  Program	  (1959	  –	  1968)	  
–  Experimental	  rocket-­‐powered	  research	  vehicle	  	  
–  Research	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  piloted	  hypersonic	  ﬂight	  (especially	  al;tude	  
&	  speed)	  
Achieved:	  
v 	   	  199	  ﬂights	  
v 	   	  4,519	  mph	  (Mach	  6.7)	  
v 	   	  354,200	  ^	  (>	  67	  mi)	  
Data	  contributed	  to	  Projects	  Mercury,	  Gemini,	  &	  Apollo	  as	  well	  as	  Space	  
Shuble	  
Some	  ﬂights	  qualiﬁed	  as	  space	  ﬂights	  
v  	  13	  ﬂights	  exceeded	  AF	  criterion	  
v  	  2	  ﬂights	  exceeded	  FAI	  criterion	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The	  X-­‐15	  Hypersonic	  Research	  AircraM	  
5	  
Launch	  of	  the	  X-­‐15	  from	  the	  B-­‐52	  
6	  
Slide	  Courtesy	  of	  X-­‐15	  Pilot	  Astronaut	  Bill	  Dana	   7	  
The	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  
•  Three	  diﬀerent	  X-­‐15	  models	  were	  produced.	  
	  
•  All	  three	  relied	  on	  a	  Stability	  Augmenta;on	  System	  –	  the	  ﬁrst	  2	  
models	  had	  pilot-­‐selectable	  control	  gains.	  
	  
•  The	  MH-­‐96	  Adap;ve	  Flight	  Control	  System	  was	  unique	  to	  the	  
X-­‐15-­‐3	  –	  provided	  automated	  gain	  control	  and	  automated	  
engagement	  of	  reac;on	  controls.	  	  
	  
•  Pilot’s	  display	  in	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  was	  importantly	  diﬀerent	  from	  ﬁrst	  2	  
models.	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The	  APtude	  Director	  Indicator	  in	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	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Pilot’s	  Display	  Panel	  in	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  	  
Selection switch and 
indicator light for PAI  Attitude Director Indicator 
IFDS malfunction 
light 
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The	  MH-­‐96	  AdapJve	  Flight	  Control	  System	  
On	  X-­‐15-­‐3,	  the	  MH-­‐96	  AFCS	  was	  intended	  to	  provide:	  
	  
v Automa;c	  control	  of	  the	  gain	  of	  inputs	  to	  the	  
aerodynamic	  control	  surfaces	  in	  all	  three	  axes	  as	  a	  
func;on	  of	  dynamic	  pressure	  	  	  
v Automa;c	  engage/disengage	  of	  the	  reac;on	  controls	  	  
v Ability	  to	  use	  the	  right	  side	  s;ck	  for	  both	  aerodynamic	  
and	  reac;on	  controls	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ConﬁguraJon	  of	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  and	  Plan	  for	  Flight	  3-­‐65	  
§ 	  A	  high	  al;tude	  ﬂight	  –max	  al;tude	  ~	  250,000	  feet.	  
§ 	  Flight	  plan	  and	  conﬁgura;on	  similar	  to	  previous	  two	  
X-­‐15-­‐3	  ﬂights.	  
§ 	  65th	  ﬂight	  of	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3.	  
§ 	  Flight	  3-­‐65	  had	  a	  full	  schedule	  of	  maneuvers	  and	  
experiments	  including:	  
	  bow-­‐shock	  standoﬀ	  measurement,	  	  
	  solar-­‐spectrum	  measurements,	  	  
	  ultraviolet	  exhaust-­‐plume	  measurements,	  and	  
	  micrometeorite	  collec;on.	  	  
§ 	  Diﬀerences	  in	  conﬁgura;on	  of	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  for	  Flight	  
3-­‐65	  included	  a	  traversing	  probe	  installed	  in	  the	  pod	  
of	  its	  right	  wing;p	  that	  was	  operated	  for	  the	  ﬁrst	  
;me	  in	  a	  high-­‐al;tude	  ﬂight.	  
	  	   12	  
The	  Wing-­‐Jp	  Pod	  for	  Experiment	  InstallaJon	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Typical	  X-­‐15	  AlJtude	  Mission	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Key	  Events	  During	  Flight	  3-­‐65	  
10:30:07 – Launched from B-52 at 45,000 ft. altitude with all systems 
operating normally, the pilot ignited the boost rocket, and the X-15-3 
accelerated into a steep climb.  
10:31:07 – at about 90,000’, arcing from the motor drive of the traversing 
probe caused an electrical disturbance to the aircraft’s electrical system that 
continued until 10:33:53.  Noise begins in all telemetered data channels. 
10:31:28 -  Major Adams reported IFDS computer- and the instrument-
malfunction lights. Ground Control acknowledged report. (& 10:31:58) 
10:31:34 – Pilot switched ADI to PAI mode and switched source of data for 
α and β as well as for altitude and velocity from the nose ball to IFDS and 
IMU  (while the malfunction lights were still on).  
10:31:40 to 10:32:00 – Executed wing-rock maneuver; exceeded specified 
bank angles started a slow yaw drift to the right.   
10:32:08 to 10:32:23 – Executed the computed α/β-check maneuver.  
10:32:50 – Initiated the Precision Attitude-Tracking Task   
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10:32:51 -  The Flight Controller reported to pilot, “Over the top at about 261”.  
Key	  Events	  During	  Flight	  3-­‐65	  (conJnued)	  
10:33:01 - The Flight Controller told the pilot that he was looking “real 
good”.  
10:33:05 – The pilot switched to direct control of the RCS using the left side 
stick.  Major Adams continued to try to complete execution of the precision 
attitude-tracking task.  
10:33:25 - The Flight Controller once again assured the pilot that he was “a 
little bit high,” but in “real good shape.”  
10:33:39 - The pilot reported that the aircraft control seemed "squirrelly.”  
10:34:01 - Major Adams said, “I’m in a spin.”  (& 10:34:16; 10:34:19) 
10:34:30 – After three revolutions, the aircraft came out of the spin and went 
into a 45-degree inverted dive.  
10:34:37 - the MH-96 AFCS entered into a limit-cycle instability forcing 
control surfaces into rapid, cyclic oscillation to their limit of travel at their 
maximum rate of 26o per second.  
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10:34:54 - The aircraft began to break up.  
10:34:58 - The largest pieces impacted the ground   
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Time	  Line	  of	  CriJcal	  Events	  Prior	  to	  Spin	  	  
Approximately 3 Minutes 18	  
Time	  History	  of	  MH-­‐96	  Gains	  During	  Flight	  3-­‐65	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Time	  history	  Telemetered	  Parameters	  of	  Flight	  3-­‐65	  	  
10:30:00          10:31:00            10:32:00            10:33:00           10:34:00            10:35:00 20	  
Causal	  Factors	  of	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  Accident	  
A Latent Causal Factor of the Flight 3-65 accident was 
management’s failure to require environmental testing of 
experimental equipment before it was installed on the aircraft 
(equipment not considered “flight critical”).  
A Proximate Causal Factor was the confluence of the failures of 
 1. the aircraft system design and  
 2. ground control  
to alert the pilot to the possibility of control problems and 
erroneous data when indications of malfunctions were observed.  
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Ground’s	  evidence	  of	  problems	  
Ø 	  At	  10:31:07	  (just	  1	  minute	  a^er	  launch),	  all	  of	  the	  telemetered	  data	  
suddenly	  became	  erra;c	  and	  remained	  so	  for	  several	  minutes.	  	  
Ø 	  Star;ng	  at	  10:31:07,	  the	  telemetered	  data	  on	  al;tude	  and	  velocity	  
diﬀered	  from	  the	  radar	  data	  and	  was	  noted	  by	  a	  ground	  controller.	  	  
Ø 	  At	  10:31:58,	  the	  Flight	  Controller	  acknowledged	  the	  pilot’s	  report	  that	  the	  
IFDS	  computer	  and	  instrument	  malfunc;on	  lights	  were	  on.	  	  
Ø  Between 10:31:40 and 10:32:00, during the wing-rock maneuver, a	  
member	  of	  ground	  control	  reported	  to	  the	  Flight	  Controller	  that	  the	  pilot	  
was	  having	  a	  control	  problem	  based	  on	  his	  observa;ons	  of	  larger	  than	  
normal	  pitch-­‐roll	  servo	  excursions.	  
Ø 	  	  At	  10:32:26,	  disengagement	  of	  the	  pitch	  and	  roll	  dampers	  was	  reported	  
by	  the	  pilot	  and	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  Flight	  Controller.	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10:31:07 – Evidence of problems 
10:31:13 - “Okay, right on track.”  
10:31:21 - “On profile, on heading.”  
10:31:45 – “Rock your wings and extend your experiment, Mike.”  
10:31:50 – “On heading, on profile.”  
10:31:58 –  Pilot reports “I've got a computer and instrument light!”   
10:32:14 - “Check your computed α now.”  
10:32:19 - “Right on the track.”  
10:32:28 –  Pilot reports “I lost my Pitch & Roll Dampers!”   
10:32:43 - “You are looking real good, right on the heading, Mike.”  
10:33:01 - “Your heading is going in the right direction, Mike, real good.”  
10:33:25 – “A little bit high, Mike, but real good shape.” 
10:34:01 – Pilot reports “I am in a spin!”  
10:34:03 - “Let’s get your experiment in and the camera on.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key	  Flight	  Control	  Transmissions	  During	  Flight	  3-­‐65	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ContribuJng	  Factors	  to	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  Accident	  	  
2. The design of the adaptive gain control in the MH-96 allowed a failure in 
the AFCS to interfere with the pilot’s ability to control the aircraft.  
1. The MH-96 AFCS had a known tendency to go into limit-cycle oscillations 
when the system was operating at or close to maximum gain.  
3. The pilot’s display used a single critical instrument, the Attitude Director 
Indicator, in two different modes; one a normal mode used most of the time, 
the other a mode (Precision Attitude Indicator) that was used only 
occasionally.  
4. There was no provision for backup source of reliable information for the 
pilot at high altitude when the IFDS computer malfunctioned.  
24	  
5. A speculation in the AIB  report and elsewhere was that Major Adams’ 
susceptibility to Type II Spatial Disorientation was a Contributing Factor in the 
scenario of this accident.  
ContribuJng	  Factors	  to	  the	  X-­‐15-­‐3	  Accident	  (cont.)	  
6. Major Adams did not correct the error in yaw when he switched to direct 
control of the RCS through the left side stick.  
7. Evidence suggests that Major Adams’ responses to the PAI were consistent 
with an ADI mode when he switched to the left-hand stick control of the RCS.  
8. Evidence indicates that Major Adams forgot to disengage the MH-96 AFCS 
as he was supposed to when he switched to the left side stick control.  
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Conclusions	  
1. The electrical disturbance due to arcing of unqualified experimental 
equipment precipitated the accident. 
2. The pilot had no reliable control during the electrical disturbance.  
3. The pilot was, very likely, unable to recognize the control problems. 
4. Flight 3-65 would have very likely been recoverable, if ground control had 
aborted the mission when they had clear indications of malfunctions.  
5. The focus of Major Adam’s attention on performing the precise wing-rock 
maneuver using an intermittent RCS may have distracted him from noticing 
the yaw angle acquired during the boost phase.  
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Conclusions	  (cont.)	  
7. The pilot’s ability to manage the aircraft’s various malfunctions when he 
switched to direct control was affected by an extremely high workload.  
8. The limit-cycle oscillations of controls would have probably been prevented 
had Major Adams disengaged the MH-96 AFCS when he switched to manual 
control. 
 
9. The destruction of the X-15-3 was due to the structural loads produced by 
the high frequency limit-cycle oscillations of the control surfaces induced by 
the AFCS.  
 
6. There was no evidence that Spatial Disorientation degraded Major Adam’s 
performance during the boost phase or the execution of the experimental 
maneuvers.  
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Thank	  you!	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hbp://hsi.arc.nasa.gov/awards_pubs/	  
publica;on_view.php?publica;on_id=2377	  
hbp://hsi.arc.nasa.gov/awards_pubs/	  
publica;on_view.php?publica;on_id=2378	  
For	  ques;ons,	  contact	  me	  at:	  Immanuel.Barshi@nasa.gov	  
